There is a general view in economic literature that cooperatives are under-invested.
Introduction.
The constraints on cooperative financing have for some time seemed pervasive; there is a general view in the literature that cooperatives are underinvested.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this issue. To this end, we first undertake a literature review on cooperative firms based on property rights and agency theories. This review will enable us to acquire an understanding of the different nature of cooperative capital, its link with cooperative identity and the different ownership structure of cooperatives and the reasons which could explain the financial constraints of cooperatives.
After that, we undertake different cooperative case studies extracted from the dairy sector. We studied three big dairy cooperatives with the aim to learn how they have faced these alleged constraints. We also include in the study the equity accounting classification as an issue, which has not been addressed by economic literature.
Finally, we conclude and propose possible work lines.
Cooperative: a different kind of firm, a different finance.
As is well-known, the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) affirms in its Statement on the Co-operative Identity that-"A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs, and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise". Birchall (2010) points out that "it also contains a hidden assumption that there are two organisations -an association of persons and an enterprise" and he sees this as both unhelpful and misleading and advocates for a unified vision which avoids splitting the organization in two. He proposes an alternative approach based on the concept of member-owned businesses, but as he acknowledges, the vision of a cooperative as an association and an enterprise has a long intellectual history and when we address a study on cooperatives implicitly we focus on economic views or in social views.
Our analysis of the cooperative firm will be based our paper on property rights and agency theories. Although limitations on neoclassical economic theories could arise (Marwa, 2014) , and non-economic causes for forming and maintaining cooperatives should not be taken lightly (Cook (1995); Birchall (2004) ), we think that these theories are a good starting point to explain the constraints on cooperative financing.
A firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1979) , the firm has contracts with stakeholders like its employees suppliers, customers, creditors, etc.
To Fama and Jensen (1983) contracts which play a key role in any economic organization are "those that specify 1) the nature of residual claims and 2) the allocation of decision process among the agents". In short, all contracts, apart from those with the owners, set out fixed remunerations. At this point Hansmann (1996) states that the type of patron 1 who owns the firm is that which minimizes the sum of total transaction costs for all type of patrons, where transactions costs include the cost of market contracting and costs of ownershsip. "A cooperative can be defined as an economic organization whose residual claims are restricted to the agent group that supplies patronage under the organization's nexus of contracts (i.e. member-patron) and whose board of directors is elected by the same group" (Vitiliano, 1983) . To Nilsson (2001) the differences between investor-owned (IOF) and cooperative firms are due essentially to the vaguely defined property rights in cooperative organizations. In fact to Hansmann (1996) an IOF can be seen as a capital cooperative, that is to say the patron owner is the capital supplier and this capital is rewarded with the residual claim.
Paradoxically, these vaguely defined property rights are originated by the common ownership and (to a lesser extent) by the democratic control. What follows from this is an inefficient organization (Porter and Scully, 1987) , and consequently this would result in the disappearance of cooperatives. Therefore, "noneconomic causes for forming cooperatives should not be taken lightly" (Cook, 1995) , but as Nilsson (2001) (Hakelius, 1996) . Although it is true that social factors are crucial to cooperative organizations; they are interconnected with economic factors, as Nilsson (2001) These vaguely defined property rights lead to conflicts over residual claims and decision control, resulting in the following five general problem sets (Cook, 1995) :
 the free rider problem (or the problem with common ownership);
 the horizon problem;
 the portfolio problem;
 the control problem (or the follow-up problem); and  the influence costs problem (or the decision-maker problem).
These problems explain the recurrent difficulty of cooperatives to attract capital. In this way, common ownership causes the free rider problem as new members pay a small quantity of capital to join the cooperative services diluting the capital between members.
This discourages members from investing in the cooperative.
As the residual rights of the member in the cooperative are neither appreciable nor transferable and the planning horizon of the member is limited to membership duration this discourages investing and results in suboptimal investment decisions. This is known as the horizon problem.
A well-composed investment portfolio reduces the risks and adjusts them to the risk preferences of the investor. The members are heterogeneous with regards to risk preferences (Vitiliano, 1983) , as the investment decision is tied to patronage decision, members are not able to adjust their risk preferences which at best could be adapted to the average member preference.
In addition, Chaddad and Cook (2002) summarize theoretical and empirical literature which claims that (USA agricultural) cooperatives are financially constrained as follows:
1. Cooperative residual claims are restricted.
2. Cooperatives' vaguely defined property rights structure discourages members from contributing risk capital.
3. Equity capital acquisition in cooperatives is tied to member patronage (with consequent dependence on internally generated capital).
4. Cooperative equity capital is generally not permanent.
5. Cooperatives have limited access to external sources of funds.
As new arguments we point out the following:
The first one states that as residual claims (rights) are restricted to member-patron, capital has to be provided by them and therefore is limited by their capacity.
The third one argues that cooperatives rely on internally generated capital (per units retains, patronage refunds, etc.) due to the lack of incentives to attract direct investments.
The fourth one argues that the equity capital (patronage refunds, per unit retains) is not permanent as it is allocated to individual members' accounts and is redeemable. The same could be said of redeemable members' shares, but the fact is that shares are stable and the economic literature reserves an agent control function to redeemable capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983) .
And finally the fifth one argues that residual rights are restricted to members and cannot be transferred. Therefore access to public equity markets is not available option unless the firm changes its organization form (Hart and Moore, 1996) .
Some real examples from big dairy cooperatives.
In the following lines we are going to study the financing of three dairy cooperatives and one from New Zealand and the other ones from Europe. All of them ranked in the World Co-operative Monitor.
We have chosen dairy cooperatives because, i) it defines a subsector inside the agriculture, therefore the economic activity of the cooperatives is more similar than different agricultural cooperatives and, ii) the dairy sector is very competitive and dynamic and requires high investments in capital (industrial processing of the raw milk, and the subsequent marketing of the industrial products, R+D activities, brands, etc.).
Therefore is a subsector that could point out the adaptation of the cooperative financing to these needs. The previous one is known as the share standard. In addition, each shareholder is able to hold further shares up to 20% of the share standard.
Fonterra
The rights attaching to shares include: If a shareholder decreases supply during a season, the number of shares held will be re-apportioned between the number of minimum required shares (calculated using the share standard) and the number of any additional shares that may be held.
Shares held in excess of the number required to be held by the share standard can be surrendered at the election of the shareholder. However shares representing greater than 120% of the number required by the share standard will automatically be surrendered, at the then prevailing share price.
Payment for the surrender of shares may be made at the option of the Cooperative by:
-cash; or -the issue of Capital Notes.
The Company also has the option to pay the surrender value in special circumstances by the issue of redeemable preference shares.
Shares acquired by shareholders may be paid by:
-cash; or -the redemption of any Capital Notes held (at the discretion of the Company).
Capital notes are unsecured subordinated borrowings which are quoted on NZX's debt market (NZDX). They are classified as non-current liabilities in the financial statements.
Therefore, this system tries to keep equity in hands of shareholder supplier
From 2013 Fonterra has established the "Fonterra Shareholders' Market", where shareholder suppliers are able to buy the share that they need to supply milk or sell shares in excess directly. Consequently the shares are not redeemed.
Also from 2013, shareholders may elect to sell the economic rights 4 of some of their Cooperative shares to the "Fonterra Shareholders' Fund", subject to an individual limit set by the Board within an overall individual limit set out in the Company's constitution.
On the sale of an economic right of a Cooperative share to the Fund, a Shareholder supplier transfers the legal title to the Cooperative share to the Custodian. Where the 4 The economics rights are: -the right to receive any dividends declared by the Fonterra Board;
-the right to any other distributions made in respect of Co-operative shares; and -rights to share in any surplus on liquidation of Fonterra.
Cooperative share transferred was backed by milk supply, the shareholder supplier is issued a voucher by the Custodian (subject to limits). But voting rights are kept by members shareholders.
In May 2013, Fonterra offers its shareholder suppliers to sell economic rights of shares backed by milk supply to the Fund, and to sell to Fonterra the resulting Units (Supply Offer).
Under this Offer, shareholder suppliers sold the economic rights of 60 million cooperative shares to the Custodian, resulting in the issuance of 60 million Units in the Fonterra is an example which merits a deep study. In few years Fonterra has change its equity structure, has removed the value return (returns to members according to the milk supplied), has introduced dividends on shares held, has introduced the "Fonterra Shareholders' Market" and the "Fonterra Shareholders' Fund" while the cooperative is under control of its members. Following the Chaddad and Cook (2004) models, Fonterra was a member-investment cooperative where distribution of profits were in proportion patronage to a distribution of profits according to the proportion of member shareholdings and after that to a cooperative with an internal market to transfer the shares and losing the characteristic of redeemable. Now it is a cooperative close to new generation cooperatives model.
Royal FrieslandCampina.
Royal Friesland Campina is a Dutch cooperative whose members are dairy farmers from Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. Zuivelcoöperatie FrieslandCampina U. A. Perpetual notes are perpetual subordinated loans with a 7.125% cumulative interest.
There is not repayment commitment, but the notes can be repaid (that is, they are is the proposed profit appropriation, that is to say, the proposed portion of profit to be distributed to members when it is approved by the Board of Representatives. It is formed by the supplementary payment for milk and the interest on contributed capital (interest rate of CIBOR +1.5% on individual member accounts (paid in capital)).
As it is established in the Articles of association, the member, on termination of membership does not entitle to any share of the Cooperative's property or assets. The member has only rights on individual capital, and this is paid "pursuant to the applicable provisions", that is, the Board of Representatives shall decide on any payment of delivery-based ownership certificates, contributed capital or other individualised consolidation 8 . Therefore, ownership rights in Arla are restricted to members, nonappreciable and redeemable but subject to the approval by the Board of Representatives, in order to qualify as equity accounting.
8 Article 5.
On the other hand, the farmer-member receives "on-account" price for the milk, which is paid monthly and a supplementary payment (which comprises the supplementary payment for milk and the interest on contributed capital) and the individual consolidation, which is the share of profit deposited in individual capital. Although this includes remuneration on individual capital, specifically on contributed capital, in addition on supplementary payment, it is not a mixed configuration of returns based on capital and based on patronage, the remuneration of contributed capital is capped and only represents above the 1.5 % of the Supplementary payment and less if we take account the individual consolidation which is a component of the milk price (Arla quotation).
There is a lack of information on the initial investment to entry in the cooperative, despite this lack; we can assess the cooperative structure of Arla as very close to a traditional cooperative in models identified by Chaddad and Cook (2004) . This fact raises questions on how it can explained the expansion of Arla despite the supposedly limitations on its ownership rights.
Conclusions.
The study of how some big dairy cooperatives face financing issues has shown different equity structures and how they can quickly change. Also it has showed that accounting classification as equity matters and it is a characteristic which is taken account.
Equity structures varies from more traditional as Arla Corporation with individual capital and common capital to more innovative as Fonterra with a market to exchange members' shares in order to keep the required number of shares according to the transactions with the cooperative (milk supplied). The case of Arla raises questions to the traditional economic literature on how it can explained the expansion of Arla despite the supposedly limitations on its ownership rights.
We think that an expansion of the study, adding new case-study could be of interest in order to generalize the results.
